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JURISDICTION
This appeal is from the district court of a matter over
which the Court of Appeals did not have original jurisdiction
under Subsection 78-2a-3(2) of the Utah Code.

Hence the Suoreme

Court had jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Subsection
78-2-2(3) (j) of the Utah Code.

However, the Supreme Court

transferred this matter pursuant to Subsection 78-2-2(4) of the
Utah Code, and thus this Court has jurisdiction in accordance
with Subsection 78-2a-3 (2)(j) of the Utah Code.
The Notice of Appeal filed April 8, 1996 complied with
Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, allowing
appellate review of the Order Granting Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff's Motion for a
Continuance, dated and entered in this matter on December 29,
1995; and the Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial
and to Set Aside Judgment, dated and entered in this matter on
March 11, 1996.

Record at (R. ) 166.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND EVIDENCE OF PRESERVATION
The appellant and plaintiff Leslie Scot McNair (McNair)
asserts that the pertinent issues and the corresponding standard
of review are as follows, and that these issues were preserved as
indicated:
1.

Must a defendant automobile operator moving for

2
summary judgment bear an initial burden to present evidence where
(A) the basis for the motion is that the plaintiff injured
pedestrian has not met any pleaded threshold requirement for
suing for general damagesf and (B) the motion is not ruled uoon
until the time of pretrial?

This is a question of lawf with no

need for deference to the district court's conclusions.

Walker

Drug Co., Inc. v^ La Sal Oil Co^, 902 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1995).
This standard of review remains the same when an error of law is
pointed out in a motion for new trial, since it is an abuse of
discretion not to correct an error of law made in granting a
motion for summary judgment.

Doty v. Town of Cedar Hills, 656

P.2d 993, 997 (Utah 1982).
This failure by Farris to bear his burden as the moving
party was raised in McNair's Memorandum in Support of Motion for
New Trial and to Set Aside Judgment dated January 8, 1996 (R.
108-112), in the Reoly Memorandum in Support of Motion for New
Trial and to Set Aside Judgment dated January 29, 1996 (R. 144146), and in the Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and
Request to Set Aside Judgment held February 23, 1996 (R. 175-179,
188-190).
2.

Has an injured pedestrian sufficiently shown the

existence of a genuine issue of material fact by pleading
permanent disability and stating at pretrial that he still has
pain and problems more than a year after the injury and is hoping
to be examined before trial by a medical provider where (A) the
automobile operator has moved for summary judgment on the basis
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162-163), in McNair's Memorandum dated December 13, 1995 (R. 88),
in his Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial and to Set
Aside Judgment dated January 8, 1996 (R. 111-112), and in the
Affidavit of Leslie S. McNair dated January 10, 1996 (R. 123124).
3.

Must a dismissal be without prejudice where (A) an

injured pedestrian has sued a automobile operator for general and
special damages, (B) the automobile operator has been granted
summary judgment on the basis that the injured pedestrian cannot
prove at trial any of the threshold requirements for a suit for
general damages, (C) the motion is made after the matter has been
set for trial and is granted at the time of pretrial, and (D) the
pedestrian states that he still has pain and problems more than a
year after the injury and is planning on obtaining medical
attention in the very near future?

This is a question of law,

with no need for deference to the district court's conclusions.
Id.
McNair urged that any dismissal should be without
prejudice at the Pre-Trial Conference held December 8, 1995 (R.
160), in McNair1s Memorandum dated December 13, 1995 (R. 88), in
his Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial and to Set
Aside Judgment dated January 8, 1996 (R. 113-114), in the Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial and to Set Aside
Judgment dated January 29, 1996 (R. 146-147), and in the Hearing
on Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and Request to Set Aside
Judgment held February 23, 1996 (R. 180).
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Thus the record shows that each question "was timely
presented to the trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a
ruling thereon."

Franklin Financial v. New Empire Develop. Co.,

659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983).

DETERMINATIVE LAW
STATUTES, ETC., TO BE INTERPRETED
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances,
rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative
consist of the following:
Section 31A-22-309(1) of the Utah Code:
(1) A person who has or is required to have
direct benefit coverage under a policy which
includes personal injury protection may not
maintain a cause of action for general damages
arising out of personal injuries alleged to
have been caused by an automobile accident,
except where the person has sustained one or
more of the following:
(a) death;
(b) dismemberment;
(c) permanent disability or permanent
impairment based upon objective findings;
(d) permanent disfigurement; or
(e) medical expenses to a person in
excess of $3,000.
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (URCP):
Rule 16. Pretrial conferences, scheduling, and
management, conferences.
(a) Pretrial conferences. In any action,
the court in its discretion or upon motion of a
party, may direct the attorneys for the parties
and any unrepresented parties to appear before
it for a conference or conferences before trial
for such purposes as:
(1) expediting the disposition of the
action;
(2) establishing early and continuing
control so that the case will not be protracted
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for lack of management;
(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial
activities;
(4) improving the quality of the trial
through more thorough preparation;
(5) facilitating the settlement of the
case; and
(6) considering other matters as may aid
in the orderly disposition of the case.
(b) Scheduling and management conferences.
•• •

(c) Final pretrial or settlement
conferences. In any action where a final
pretrial conference has been ordered, it shall
be held as close to the time of trial as
reasonable under the circumstances. The
conference shall be attended by at least one of
the attorneys who will conduct the trial for
each of the parties, and the attorneys
attending the pretrial, unless waived by the
court, shall have available, either in person
or by telephone, the appropriate parties who
have authority to make binding decisions
regarding settlement.
(d) Sanctions. If a party or a party's
attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial
order, if no appearance is made on behalf of a
party at a scheduling or pretrial conference,
if a party or a party's attorney is
substantially unprepared to participate in the
conference, or if a party or a party's attorney
fails to participate in good faith, the court,
upon motion or it own initiative, may make such
orders with regard thereto as are just, and
among others, any of the orders provided in
Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D). In lieu of or in
addition to any other sanctions, the court
shall require the party or the attorney
representing him or both to pay the reasonable
expenses incurred because of any noncompliance
with this rule, including attorney fees, unless
the court finds that the noncompliance was
substantially justified or that other
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. ...
(b) For defending party. A party against
whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought,
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mayf at any time, move with or without
supporting affidavits, for a summary judgment
in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion or proceedings thereon. The
motion shall be served at least 10 days before
the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse
party prior to the day of hearing may serve
opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall
be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on
the issue of liability alone although there is
a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion.
...

(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony;
defense required. Suoporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge,
shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn
or certified copies of all papers or parts
thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be
attached thereto or served therewith. The
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented
or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a
motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading, but his response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he
does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. ...
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. ...

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant and appellee Daniel Farris (Farris) was
operating an automobile and ran over McNair's foot, breaking a
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couple of bones.

McNair began receiving medical attention for

his injury, and filed this action.

He planned on paying for the

needed surgery with his expected recovery from Farris.
McNair f s attorney thought that a broken bone was
sufficient to allow recovery of general damages.

However, the

Complaint also alleged the existence of permanent disability.
Farris moved for summary judgment with a supporting
affidavit dealing only with the fact that medical expenses had
not exceeded $3,000.

He addressed the allegation of permanent

disability outside of the affidavit in conclusory terms.

This

motion was granted at pretrial in the face of arguments that
McNair still had pain and problems more than a year after the
injury and was hoping to be examined before trial by a medical
provider.
In denying a subsequent motion for a new trial, the
trial court excused Farris f s failure to carry his burden to show
an absence of permanent disability by emphasizing that the ruling
took place at pretrial and no evidence had been produced by
McNair.

However, no pretrial order required McNair to have named

an expert or otherwise have produced evidence before the trial.
The facts in more detail are as follows:
1.

On October 10, 1994 in Salt Lake City, Utah,

defendant Farris drove an automobile over the foot of plaintiff
McNair.

R. 1-2.
2.

McNair filed a Complaint dated October 17, 1994 in

Third District Court in Salt Lake County, Utah, stating that
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Farris had been negligent and that McNair should have a judgment
against him for the damage and loss arising from the injuries he
caused McNair to suffer.
3.

R. 1-3.

The said Complaint specified that the injuries,

damage and loss included (a) fracture of bones in left foot; (b)
injury to soft tissues in left foot and ankle; (c) permanent
disability; (d) pain and suffering, both mental and physical,
past and future; (e) medical bills, past and future; and (f) loss
of earnings and earning capacity.
4.

R. 2.

In response, Farris filed an Answer and Demand for

Jury Trial dated November 1, 1994.

R. 7-12.

5.

The parties then each pursued discovery.

R. 13-56.

6.

During the course of this discovery, Farris explored

the issue of permanent disability in the deposition taken of
McNair on February 9, 1995.

The following is recorded on page 38

of the transcript of that deposition and affirmed as true in a
subsequent affidavit executed by McNair and filed with the trial
court:
Q. So, you got a release, then to go back to
work recently; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you anticipate further treatment?
A. I don't know.
Q. Do you have a pending appointment with Dr.
Gordon?
A. No.
Q. Has he told you anything along the lines
that you are going to have a permanent injury, or did
he give you any indication of what the future will
hold?
A. No.
Q. At the present time, Lee, do you have —
what problems are you having with your foot?
A. Extreme soreness. I have a problem with
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balance. The foot is weaker now. My leg is weaker,
now, in fact, from being casted. I suppose that will
come back. It is still very, very sore. It was
crushed and it was crushed slowly. The tire was
turning and grinding on it. It is taken a lot longer
to heal. It is not one simple injury, you know. Had I
tripped and snapped a bone, you know, perhaps it would
be simpler.
R. 123.
7.
R. 57-58.

McNair filed a Certification of Readiness for Trial.

On September 26, 1995 the trial court responded by

setting December 11, 1995 as the date of the jury trial, and
scheduling a pretrial conference for December 8, 1995.
8.

Farris then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment

dated November 17, 1995.
9.

R. 59.

R. 61.

Farris ! s Motion was based on the fact that McNair

had not yet incurred medical expenses in the amount of $3,000.
Thus he had not satisfied one of the alternative threshold
requirements under the no-fault law listed in Section 31^-22-309
of the Utah Code.
10.

R. 63-68.

McNair's attorney had been under the impression

that a fracture was still sufficient under the statute to allow a
claim for general damages.
11.

R. 123.

Therefore, McNair responded with a Motion for

Continuance of Trial Date, dated November 22, 1995. R. 72-73.
12.

In his supporting Memorandum, McNair acknowledged

that his medical expenses to date were less than $3,000.

R. 74.

However, he pointed out that he could still meet the threshold by
proving "permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon
objective findings" as found in Section 31A-22-309(1)(c).

R. 74.
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He sought a continuance to be better able to do that.
13.

R. 74-76.

Farris filed a Reply Memorandum dated November 29,

1995, and included therein the unsupported assertion that there
was no "evidence to suggest that the plaintiff will be found to
have a permanent disability or permanent impairment for the
fractures of the left third and fourth metatarsal of his foot."
R. 81-82.
14.

At the pretrial conference on December 8f 1995,

McNair1s counsel reviewed the difficulties encountered in
obtaining a doctor's opinion as to permanent impairment based on
the pain and problems McNair still suffered, and indicated that
if the Motion for Summary Judgment were to be granted, it should
be without prejudice.
15.

R. 157-158, 160.

The trial court initially denied the Motion for

Summary Judgment, but indicated that if there were no permanent
injury shown at trial, McNair might have to pay the jury fees.
R. 162.
16.

McNair1s counsel offered to have the Motion granted

in the event a doctor were to tell him that afternoon that there
was no permanent injury.
17.

R. 162.

Farris 1 s counsel argued that discovery had been

conducted for months, that no evidence had been presented before
the Court that there was a permanent impairment, that medical
records had been provided but no experts designated, and that the
Motion was ripe for an immediate ruling.
18.

R. 162-163.

However, no order had been entered requiring
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designation of expert witnesses.

R. 1-84.

Furthermore, the

names of the doctors attending McNair, and whom he intended to
see, were on those medical records provided to Farris.

R. 78,

157, 163.
19.

Based on the fact that a ruling was indeed due on

the Motion, and deciding it was well-taken, the trial court
granted Farris's Motion for Summary Judgment.
20.

R. 164.

Despite McNair1s subsequent objection (R. 86), the

trial court executed an Order finding no cause of action, with
prejudice.
21.

R. 99-100.
Through new counsel, McNair filed a Motion for New

Trial, pointing out that Farris had never carried his burden in
moving for summary judgment, that there was a viable issue of
fact for trial, and that prejudice should not have attached.

R.

105-116.
22.

That motion was denied, with the trial court

emphasizing how little time had remained before trial.

R. 190-

194.
23.

Thereafter McNair instituted this appeal.

R. 166.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

In moving for summary judgment, Farris did not carry

his burden of proving there was no genuine issue regarding the
no-fault threshold.
Farris supplied no affidavit affirming that McNair did
not suffer permanent disability or permanent impairment as a
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result of being injured by Farris.

His motion could not be

properly granted in the absence of such an affidavit.
His burden of proof was not lightened as the time of
trial neared and a final pretrial was held.
2.

In his opposition to the summary judgment motion

unsupoorted by an affidavit regarding permanent impairment,
McNair raised a genuine issue of material fact through his
pleadings and by stating at pretrial that he still had pain and
problems more than a year after the injury.
There was no special knowledge required of an expert to
assist the trier of fact in determining whether McNair's symptoms
evidenced permanent disability or permanent impairment.
Nevertheless, McNairfs assertion of this issue of fact
was bolstered by his expected examination before trial by a
medical provider.

The fact that the provider was not identified

as an expert witness was irrelevant since he was named in
discovery and since the court had not ordered such
identif ication.
3.

A dismissal at pretrial for failure to meet the

threshold requirements should not be with prejudice.

McNair

never had a trial at which to prove the threshold requirements
were met.
Furthermore, a dismissal with prejudice could prevent
recovery for soecial damages, and would prohibit recovery of
general damages despite imminent satisfaction of the threshold
requirements.
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ARGUMENT
1.

IN MOVING FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, FARRIS DID NOT CARRY

HIS BURDEN OF PROVING THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE REGARDING THE
NO-FAULT THRESHOLD.
Farris had the initial burden.
The initial burden in a motion for summary judgment is
on the moving party.

It is not enough for that party to make

bare allegations that the non-movinq party has no evidence to
support its position.
McNair alleged in his Complaint that "plaintiff was
caused to and continues to suffer from ... (c)
disability."

Permanent

R. 2.

This allegation, if proven at trial, would allow McNair
to maintain a cause of action for general damages pursuant to
Section 31A-22-309 of the Utah Code.
However, Farris in his Motion for Summary Judgment and
supporting material did not address this allegation.

The closest

he came was the unsupported allegation that McNair1s injuries did
not constitute a "serious impairment of bodily function."

R. 66.

The affidavit supporting the Motion only dealt with an
alternative basis found in that Section of the Code, namely, "(e)
medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000."
As indicated above, Farris had explored the issue of
permanent disability in the deposition taken of McNair on
February 9, 1995.

He knew of this evidence concerning the

residual effects of McNair's injury, but he did not marshall it
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for the court's benefit.
Farris also failed to provide the court with an
affidavit to show that there was no permanent disability.

This

was the burden that Farris, as the moving party, had to carry.
The case of Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d
1229 (Utah 1995) is instructive on this point.

In that case, the

issue was whether damage occurred within three years prior to the
filing of the action.

If it did, the statute of limitation did

not bar an action by the Walkers based on a continuing nuisance.
La Sal moved for summary judgment, claiming the Walkers
had produced no evidence of such recent damage.

However, the

opinion noted that the Walkers had no duty to produce such
evidence in the absence of an affidavit demonstrating that no
damage had occurred that recently.
[A]s the moving party, La Sal had the initial
burden to present evidence that the Walkers did
not sustain such damage, and the Walkers were
under no obligation to present opposing
evidence until La Sal met that burden. See K ^
T\_ Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah
1994); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e).
Because La Sal failed to present evidence that
the Walkers did not sustain any damage within
three years prior to the filing of their
complaint, the Walkers may not be penalized for
failing to present evidence in opposition. Id.
at 1233.
Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the summary
judgment that had been granted on that issue.
In the case cited in that quote, K £ ZJL Inc. v.
Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623 (Utah 1994), summary judgment was reversed
on the same basis.
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In the K _& T case, Montana Brand had to show that there
were no disputed material issues of fact regarding its lack of
actual knowledge.

The company supolied an affidavit that no one

was informed by First Security Bank, and an affidavit from
Koroulis that he didn f t inform anyone.

However, the company did

not supply an affidavit showing that it did not acquire this
knowledge from some other source.
Therefore, "Montana Brand failed to meet its affirmative
burden, as the party moving for summary judgment, of establishing
that there were no disputed material issues of fact."

Tj3. at

628.
In the case of Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed. 265 (1986), one of the fiv^ justices
joining the majority, Justice White, wrote in a concurring
opinion to clearly describe the burden of the moving party in a
motion for summary judgment:
I also agree that the movant may rely on
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
the like, to demonstrate that the plaintiff has
no evidence to prove his case and hence that
there can be no factual disoute. But the
movant must discharge the burden the Rules
place upon him: I_t jjs not enough to move for
summary judgment without supoorting the motion
in any way or with a conclusory assertion that
the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his
case. :id. 477 U.S. at 328, 106 S.Ct. at 2555
(White, J., concurring). (Emphasis added.)
This concurring opinion is cited for these orinciples by
Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun, two of the three other dissenters:
Plainly, a conclusory assertion that the
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nonmoving party has no evidence is
insufficient. See ante, at 2555 (WHITE, J.,
concurring). Such a "burden" of production is
no burden at all and would simply permit
summary judgment procedure to be converted into
a tool for harassment. Id. 477 U.S. at 3 32,
106 S.Ct. at 2557 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
(Emphasis added.)
Farris supplied no affidavit affirming that McNair did not suffer
permanent disability or permanent impairment.
Unless and until Farris properly met his burden to
demonstrate the absence of a material fact, McNair had no
obligation to bring forth evidence of a permanent disability.

So

how can his failure to fulfill this obligation which he did not
yet have demonstrate a purported absence of an issue as to that
fact and shift the burden to McNair to then bring forth such
evidence?
Farris could have borne his burden in one of two ways.
He could have shown that the pleadings raised no such issue, or
he could have provided admissible evidence that there was no
permanent disability.
Farris could not show that the pleadings did not raise
the issue, since McNair alleged in his Complaint that "plaintiff
was caused to and continues to suffer from
disability."

R. 2.

, (c)

Permanent

Furthermore, Farris did not provide any

evidence that there was no permanent disability.
Thus Farris utterly failed to carry the burden required
of a party making a motion for summary judgment.
Farris could have had an independent medical examination
of McNair and thereby obtained evidence of a lack of permanent
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injury, if indeed there was none.

He failed to do so.

Rather,

he did not address the specific allegation of permanent injury at
all, making only the bare assertion, "Injuries claimed by
plaintiff do not constitute a 'serious impairment of bodily
function1 and do not meet the threshold requirements of the nofault automobile insurance act."

R. 66.

In the case cited by Farris in support of his motion,
Zoldas v. Louise Cab Corp., 489 N.Y.S.2d 468 (A.D.I Oept. 1985),
the moving parties not only marshalled all evidence showing the
seriousness of the injury, but the affidavit of their neurologist
finding no abnormalities.

They had borne their burden.

Farris

here has provided no such evidence.
Since there was no affidavit or other evidence that
McNair did not have a permanent disability, Farris f s burden as
the moving party was not met.

Thus McNair could not be oenalized

for failing to provide evidence in opoosition.
Farris 1 s burden was not any less at pretrial held shortly before
trial.
The trial court indicated at the hearing on McNair!s
Motion for a New Trial that he agreed with the foregoing
principles of the law, but that they did not apply at the time of
pretrial, a few days before trial.

R. 190-191.

However, as McNair stated to the trial court, there is
nothing in the rules or case law indicating that the movant's
burden is decreased if the summary judgment motion is made just
before trial.

R. 188.
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Clearly Rule 56 URCP draws no distinction based upon the
time remaining before trial.
Rule 16(c) URCP does refer to the time of trialf
indicating a final pretrial should be held as close to the time
of trial as reasonable.

It specifies that trial counsel should

be present, and the parties should be available.
The notice of the final pretrial was just thatf merely
a notice of the time, place and date.
counsel were present.

R. 59.

Plaintiff and his

R. 157. Thus there was compliance with

Rule 16 (c).
Rule 16(a) URCP deals with pretrial conferences in
general.

It lists purposes for pretrial conferences, which in

summary are to manage the case for purposes of efficiency and
settlement.

The rule does not change the law applicable to

summary judgment motions.
Finally, Rule 16(d) addresses sanctions.

The grounds

listed for sanctions are essentially first, the failure to obey
an order or second, the failure to appear ready to participate as
required by the rule.
Generally, the failure to obey an order is the basis for
sanctions under Rule 16. The rule references parts of Rule 37(b)
as examples of appropriate sanctioning orders.

That rule also

deals with sanctions for disobedience of a court order.
Thus the case of Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307 (Utah
1993) upheld a sanction where there was noncompliance with an
order.

On the other hand, the case of Berrett v. Denver and Rio
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Grande W^_ R 1 , 830 P.2d 291 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 836
P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992) found an abuse of discretion where the
trial court excluded testimony of an expert witness in the
absence of a court order setting a deadline for naming such
witnesses.
In the instant matter, there was no prior order.

Hence

no sanctions could be based on a failure to obey an order.
As to the other basis for sanctions, the failure to
appear ready to participate as required by the rule, both McNair
and his attorney were present at the time set.

R. 157.

They

were both ready and willing to participate as required by the
rule.

There was no mention of any failure on their part to

participate in settlement discussions or otherwise at the
pretrial.
Obviously the trial court had concerns that McNair would
be unprepared for trial, and that perhaps he could not carry his
burden at that time.

R. 162. In fact, he felt that if McNair

could not go forward to prove his case on the day of trial, the
lack of preparation might well warrant assessment of additional
costs.

R. 162.
However, no scheduling order had been violated because

there was none.

McNair and his attorney adequately prepared for

and participated at pretrial.

Thus there were no grounds for

sanctions under Rule 16 URCP.
There is no penumbra to the rules which will allow a
trial court to say at the final pretrial, "I do not believe you
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will have the evidence you need for a prima facie case at trial,
so your case is dismissed," even when adding the phrase, "since
there is a summary judgment motion pending against you."

The

rules applicable to motions for summary judgment cannot be
abrogated in that manner.
The case of Jepson v. State Dept. of Corrections, 846
P.2d 485 (Utah Apo. 1993) stands for the proposition that a case
may be filed before the threshold requirements of Section 31A-22309 are met.

It states that the injured party has until the time

of tjrial, not just until pretrial, to prove compliance with those
requirements.
Thus McNair never had a duty to produce evidence of a
permanent injury.

It was an error of law for the trial court to

dismiss his action for failing to produce such evidence in
compliance with a burden he did not have.
The trial court was evidently correct in concluding that
Farris's Motion was timely and deserved a ruling.

R. 164.

However, the appropriate and correct ruling would have been a
denial.

As it was, McNair faced an unwarranted surprise and

ambush in having to carry a burden at pretrial which under the
law he was not required to carry until trial.
2.

IN HIS OPPOSITION TO THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION

UNSUPPORTED BY AN AFFIDAVIT REGARDING PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT,
McNAlR RAISED A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT.
McNair could rely on his pleadings«
Since Farris had not used any affidavits to support his
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position regarding permanent injury, McNair was entitled to rely
upon the Complaint to raise an issue of fact.
As indicated above, McNair alleged in his Complaint that
"plaintiff was caused to and continues to suffer from ... (c)
Permanent disability."

R. 2.

The case of Gadd v^ Olson, 685 P.2d 1041, 1045 (Utah
1984) stated:
When read in light of section (b) of Rule 56,
which provides that the oarty moving for
summary judgment may do so "with or without
supporting affidavits," it is clear that the
section (e) requirement that a oarty opposing
the summary judgment motion file
counter-affidavits applies only when the moving
party has elected to and has filed affidavits
in support of the motion. If, as in this case,
the moving party chooses not to or simply fails
to file affidavits, section (e) is
inapplicable.
The case of Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc.,
11 Utah 2d 1, 4-5, 354 P.2d 559 (1960), stated:
A summary judgment must be supported by
evidence, admissions and inferences which when
viewed in the light most favorable to the loser
shows that, "there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Such showing must preclude all reasonable
possibility that the loser could, if given a
trial, produce evidence which would reasonably
sustain a judgment in his favor.
Evidence showed that McNair had permanent disability or
impairment.
As indicated above, McNair stated the following in his
deposition:
Q. So, you got a release, then to go back to
work recently; is that right?
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A.
Q.
A.
Q.

Yes.
And do you anticipate further treatment?
I don't know.
Do you have a pending appointment with Dr.

Gordon?
A. No.
0. Has he told you anything along the lines
that you are going to have a permanent injury, or did
he give you any indication of what the future will
hold?
A. No.
Q. At the present time, Lee, do you have —
what problems are you having with your foot?
A. Extreme soreness. I have a problem with
balance. The foot is weaker now. My leg is weaker,
now, in fact, from being casted. I suppose that will
come back. It is still very, very sore. It was
crushed and it was crushed slowly. The tire was
turning and grinding on it. It is taken a lot longer
to heal. It is not one simple injury, you know. Had I

tripped

and snapped

a bone,

you know, perhaps

it

would

be simpler.
R. 123.
That excerpt alone, when viewed in the light most
favorable to McNair, shows that McNair was capable of producing
evidence at trial which would have sustained a judgment in his
favor.
As indicated above and as McNair argued at the pretrial,
he still had symptoms, he still had oain and other problems.
157.

R.

The jury would not have needed more than the testimony and

demonstrative evidence provided by McNair to reasonably conclude,
based upon objective findings, that McNair was suffering from a
permanent disability or permanent impairment.
Exper_t testimony was not required.
McNair produced an affidavit in support of his motion
for continuance, describing efforts in connection with another
medical examination.

R. 77-78.

The fact that such efforts to
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obtain an additional medical examination had not yet been
successful would not have justified granting Farris's motion.
An expert medical ooinion is only needed where the fact
to be found cannot be based on "the common knowledge and
experience of the layman."

Nixdorf v. Hickenf 612 P.2d 348, 352

(Utah 1980).
This Court more recently discussed the necessity for
expert testimony in Salt Lake City S_^ D^ y_^ Galbraith j* Green,
740 P.2d 284 (Utah App. 1987).
The issue in that case was whether there was a breach by
an insurance consultant of its duty to provide legal advice.

The

Court set forth the following principles as the basis for its
holding that expert testimony was not required to show the
standard of care:
If the matter at issue in the case is one
which requires special knowledge not held by
the trier of fact, expert evidence must be
presented. If, however, the matter is one
which is within the knowledge of the average
trier of fact, no expert testimony is
required. [Citations.]
Expert testimony is not required "simply
because the circumstances are outside the
average juror's experience if the other
evidence is such as to oresent the issues in
terms which the jury can be expected to
understand." [Citation.] If the jury is
capable of understanding the primary facts of
the case and drawing correct conclusions from
them, no expert testimony is required. Ld. at
289.
Here, the injury was over a year old.

Since McNair was

still suffering a disability at the time of trial, the jury would
be qualified to reasonably and justifiably find that the
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disability was permanent.

This issue was not so technical as to

have required expert opinion.
An expert witness would likely have testified.
Had the date for trial remained set, it is likely that
McNair and his treating physicians would have made extraordinary
efforts and would have presented expert testimony at trial
concerning the permanency and extent of McNairfs injuries.
In arguing against McNair's Motion for a New Trial,
Farris stated that it was irrelevant that McNair had until the
time of trial to produce his evidence, since the date set foi^
trial had passed.

R. 134.

Thus Farris once again urged the

trial court to penalize McNair for failing to carry a burden he
did not have.

McNair had until the trial to produce evidence of

permanent injury.

Once the trial court denied McNair a trial, he

had no duty to produce such evidence before the date previously
set for the trial.
Farris emphasized to the judge at pretrial that no
expert witness had been designated.
requiring such designation.

However, there was no order

Moreover, McNair informed the trial

court that the names of the doctors he had seen and planned on
consulting with had been furnished to Farris.

R. 78, 157, 163.

Thus there was no basis for excluding as witnesses the
doctors McNair planned to see.

As mentioned above, the case of

Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande W. R., 830 P.2d 291 (Utah App.
1992), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992) found an abuse of
discretion where the trial court excluded testimony of an expert
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witness in the absence of a court order setting a deadline for
naming such witnesses.
3.

A DISMISSAL AT PRETRIAL FOR FAILURE TO MEET THE

THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS SHOULD NOT BE WITH PREJUDICE.
The statute provides for general damages upon meeting the
threshold.
Not only was the summary judgment dismissing the action
an error in law, but it was error to dismiss the case with
prejudice.
Farris cited the case of Tucker v. Walkerf 335 So.2d 636
(Fla. App. 1976), for the proposition that a dismissal for
failure to meet the no-fault threshold requirements should be
with prejudice.

R. 94.

It is true that the Tucker opinion upheld a dismissal
with prejudice.

However, in so doing, it distinguished two prior

cases where the ruling was that the dismissal should have been
without prejudice.

The basis of the distinction was that in

Tucker the issues were resolved against the claimant by a jury.
Likewise another case cited by Farris f Coughlin v.
LaBounty, 354 N.W.2d 48 (Minn. App. 1984), involved a situation
where the facts had been found by a jury.
In the instant matter, McNair sought to present his case
to a jury, including proof of his satisfaction of the threshold
requirements, but he never got that chance.
One of the prior cases cited and distinguished by Tucker
was Lasky v. State Farm Insurance Co., 296 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
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There the Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the threshold statute and the dismissal of the complaint filed.
However, it stated that the dismissal must be without prejudice,
since to hold otherwise would deprive the injured parties fro^n
the remedy allowed by the legislature for persons in their
situation:
As noted earlier, the appellants in this action
have now in fact exceeded the one thousand
dollar "threshold" requirement of F.S. Sec.
627.737(2), F.S.A., and thus would be entitled,
under the act, to pursue their claims for
intangible damages for pain and suffering,
etc., absent the trial court's order of
dismissal prior to such a showing. To allow
the earlier dismissal of the complaint with
prejudice to stand would have the effect of
depriving the appellants of their rights under
the statute by virtue of dismissal of an action
that had not accrued as of the time of
dismissal. Under such an interpretation, the
dismissal in the instant cause would bar all
recovery despite qualification thereafter to
sue. We find such a construction untenable and
hold that the plaintiff may sue for such
damages once the "threshold" has been crossed,
so long as it is within the statute of
limitations. _Id. at 23.
This holding was followed in the case of Smith v. U. S.
Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 305 So.2d 216 (Fla. App. 1974), where
the depositions and written interrogatories revealed that the
medical expenses were too low and that there was no evidence
adduced to show any disability.

That opinion found no error in

the dismissal except that it was entered with prejudice.

|

A dismissal without prejudice does not increase uncertainty^
Farris urged that dismissal without prejudice would be
bad policy.

He argued that so doing would introduce considerable
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uncertainty in the law, citing Jepson, supra,

R. 133-134.

In Jeoson, the uncertainty referred to was that of
extending the statute of limitations to the distant future when
the threshold might be crossed.

There is no such problem when a

case is dismissed without prejudice.

The most the time for

filing is extended beyond the normal statute of limitations is
one year after dismissal.

The pertinent statute, Section 78-12-

40 of the Utah Code, extends the limitation period to that extent
for practically every case dismissed without prejudice.

There is

no reason for the normal extension period to cause greater
problems in the context of the no-fault threshold than in any
other context.
In this case, McNair was injured in 1994 and had until
1998 to file initially.

So a dismissal without prejudice would

not have extended at all the time of uncertainty that Farris
originally faced.
h dismissal with prejudice could wrongfully preclude recovery of
special damages.
As indicated in the excerpt of McNair1s deposition
quoted above, McNair did not know in February of 19 95 if future
medical treatment would be necessary.

Later, in view of his

deteriorated condition, his doctor advised him to have surgery
performed.

R. 124.

No meeting of any threshold requirements is required in
an action for actual medical expenses and lost wages.
Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980).

Allstate

Noon v. Smith, 829

29
P.2d 922 (Kan. App. 1992).
However, a dismissal with prejudice not only prevents
any compensation for general damages, but may well also be
considered res judicata so as to preclude McNair from receiving
any compensation for medical expenses and other special damages
beyond the limits of the personal injury protection payments.
This demonstrates another good reason for the courts to
hold, as they have, that any dismissal for failure to meet the
threshold requirements, except when the matter has gone to trial,
must be without prejudice.

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the Order Granting Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, it should
reverse the Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial*
The case should then be remanded for trial.
The basis for such a reversal is that in moving for
summary judgment, Farris did not carry his initial burden of
showing there was no genuine issue regarding the no-fault
threshold.

It was irrelevant that a ruling on his motion came at

the time of final pretrial.
An additional and alternative basis is that even though
he had no duty to do so, McNair raised a genuine issue of
material fact by stating at pretrial that he still had pain and
problems more than a year after the injury.

Such evidence would

support a finding of permanent disability or permanent
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impairment.

Expert testimony was also expected and permissible.

In the alternative, this Court should so reverse the
aspect of prejudice.

That is, the Court should rule that the

dismissal of this action must be reentered without prejudice.
The basis for such a ruling is that McNair had until
trial to prove the threshold requirements would be met and no
trial was ever held.
Furthermore, McNair either has already satisfied one of
the threshold requirements, or such satisfaction is imminent.

ADDENDUM
No addendum is necessary.
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